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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Appellant, The Pitt News, is a student-run newspaper at 
the University of Pittsburgh. It sought to enjoin the 
enforcement of a 1996 amendment to the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania's Liquor Code, codified at 47 P.S.S4-498(e)(5) 
and known as "Act 199." This amendment provides 
criminal sanctions against businesses that advertise 
alcoholic beverages in newspapers and other materials 
"published by, for or in behalf of any educational 
institution." Id. The Pitt News  sought declaratory and 
preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S 1983, 
arguing that Act 199 violates the First Amendment. 
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The District Court denied the motion for a preliminary 
injunction, holding that The Pitt News lacked standing to 
bring this challenge because only advertisers, and not the 
newspaper itself, are subject to prosecution under Act 199. 
Because the District Court reasoned that The Pitt News felt 
only indirect economic effects resulting from a regulation 
aimed at third parties, it held that the newspaper did not 
suffer an injury to its own constitutionally protected 
interests, and therefore was not a proper party to bring this 
challenge.1 The Pitt News appeals, arguing that its own 
First Amendment rights have been infringed by Act 199, 
which has had the effect of reducing its advertising 
revenue, and thereby the length of its publication. The Pitt 
News also claims that it may assert the constitutional 
rights of its former advertisers and its adult readers, 
neither of whom are parties to this litigation. 
 
We hold that The Pitt News does have standing to argue 
that Act 199 infringes upon its own First Amendment 
rights. However, The Pitt News lacks standing to challenge 
Act 199 on behalf of these third parties. We will therefore 
proceed to the merits of the preliminary injunction only on 
the question of whether the economic effect felt by The Pitt 
News amounts to a violation of its own First Amendment 




The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343, and 2201. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1). 
 
III. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
The Pitt News is a student-run newspaper, published 
under the supervision of the University of Pittsburgh. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court also reasoned, in the alternative, that even if The 
Pitt News had standing to pursue the preliminary injunction, it had 
failed to establish that the enforcement of Act 199 had caused the 
newspaper irreparable injury, as would be required for preliminary 
injunctive relief. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 22,P. 30. 
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Students have full editorial control over the content of the 
newspaper, and it is entirely supported by advertising 
revenue. It is distributed free of charge in racks at 75 
locations around the school campus. It is read by 
University of Pittsburgh students and faculty, as well as by 
members of the public at large. Approximately 75% of its 
readers are 21 years of age or older. 
 
In 1996, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted the 
challenged amendments to the Pennsylvania Liquor Code 
known as Act 199, codified at 47 P.S. S4-498(e)(5). Act 199 
provides that: 
 
       (e) The following shall apply to all alcoholic bev erage 
       and malt beverage advertising: 
 
       (5) No advertisement shall be permitted, either 
       directly or indirectly, in any booklet, program 
       book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, periodical, 
       brochure, circular or other similar publication 
       published by, for or in behalf of any educational 
       institution. 
 
       (g) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
       "advertisement" shall mean any advertising of 
       alcoholic beverages through the medium of radio 
       broadcast, television broadcast, newspapers, 
       periodicals or other publication, outdoor 
       advertisement or any other printed or graphic 
       matter, including booklets, flyers or cards, or on the 
       product label or attachment itself. 
 
47 P.S. S 4-498 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 
Violation of Act 199 is a misdemeanor. Violators may 
receive a fine of between $100 and $500 for afirst offense, 
or imprisonment for up to three months. A second offense 
carries a mandatory minimum sentence of three months in 
jail. Although there is no legislative history explaining the 
purpose of Act 199, the Commonwealth asserts that it was 
designed to address problems of underage drinking on 
campus, as well as binge drinking on campus by both 
adults and minors. 
 
Violations of Act 199 are investigated, and arrests are 
made, by the Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement 
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("BLCE") of the Pennsylvania State Police. However, the 
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board ("LCB") issues 
interpretations of state liquor laws that are binding on the 
BLCE. The LCB has ruled that Act 199 can only be 
enforced against liquor licensees or manufacturers. Thus, a 
bar or restaurant that advertises drink specials or other 
information pertaining to alcoholic beverages in The Pitt 
News could be subject to criminal sanctions, but The Pitt 
News or its staff could never be prosecuted. 
 
In December of 1997, a restaurant called the "Fuel & 
Fuddle," which placed alcohol-related advertisements in The 
Pitt News, was cited for violation of Act 199. This in turn 
led it to cancel its contract with The Pitt News . It is 
uncontested that this prosecution led other advertisers to 
cancel their contracts as well, resulting in a direct loss to 
The Pitt News of more than $17,000 in advertising revenue.2 
 
Because The Pitt News follows a "50/50" format, whereby 
it must run equal proportions of advertising and text, this 
reduction in advertising caused The Pitt News  to shorten its 
newspaper, thereby losing space in which to print student 
articles and photographs. Additionally, the loss of revenue 
threatens the newspaper's ability to purchase new 
equipment and make renovations to its facilities, and has 
placed it in a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. 
 
The Pitt News sued the defendant appellees, who are D. 
Michael Fisher, the Pennsylvania Attorney General; Major 
Francis Koscelnak, the Director of the BCLE; and John E. 
Jones, III, the Chairman of the LCB. The Pitt News sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.S 1983, 
alleging that enforcement of Act 199 violates its rights 
and/or those of its advertisers and adult readers under the 
First Amendment. The District Court held a hearing on the 
motion for a preliminary injunction, and ruled that The Pitt 
News did not have sufficient standing to bring this suit. 
The District Court reasoned that The Pitt News  could not 
make out a violation of its own First Amendment rights: 
 
       The harm that [The Pitt News] has suffered, and may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This amount does not include potential lost revenue from new 
business. 
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       suffer in the future, has been, and will be, economic, 
       and the harm has not affected, and will not affect, the 
       rights of The Pitt News to freedom of speech or of the 
       press. Because the injury suffered, or to be suffered, by 
       The Pitt News arising from the enforcement of Section 
       4-498(e)(5) of Act 199 is not, and will not be, a concrete 
       and particularized invasion of a legally protected 
       interest of The Pitt News, but, rather, an indirect 
       economic injury, The Pitt News has failed to establish 
       its standing to assert its request for a preliminary 
       injunction. 
 




Standing consists of both a "case or controversy" 
requirement stemming from Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution, and a subconstitutional "prudential" element. 
To demonstrate Article III standing, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that they have suffered an injury-in-fact, that 
the injury is causally connected and traceable to an action 
of the defendant, and that it is redressable. See Doe v. Nat'l 
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 F.3d 146, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Even when this constitutional minimum has been met, 
judicially created prudential limitations may defeat a 
party's standing to maintain a suit. See Fair Hous. Council 
of Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers , 141 
F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
As discussed infra, we conclude that The Pitt News has 
demonstrated Article III standing to bring this suit on its 
own behalf. However, prudential limitations prevent it from 
asserting the constitutional rights of its former advertisers 
or current adult readers, who are not parties to this case. 
 
A. Article III Standing 
 
1. Injury in Fact 
 
To have Article III standing, The Pitt News must first 
demonstrate that it has suffered an injury-in-fact. This 
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injury must be concrete and particularized,3 and actual or 
imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical. See 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. 
Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). "[T]he injury 
must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 and n.1, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 and 
n.1. 
 
The Pitt News has demonstrated a personal stake in the 
outcome of this litigation. It has lost approximately $17,000 
in advertising revenue as a result of the enforcement of Act 
199 against one of its advertisers. The Pitt News claims that 
this amounts to a violation of its First Amendment rights. 
As discussed in sub-section C, infra, we disagree that The 
Pitt News' First Amendment rights have been violated. 
However, our determination of the likelihood of success on 
the merits of the case is a separate inquiry from the 
threshold issue of Article III standing. To demonstrate its 
standing to sue, a plaintiff must only allege  that they have 
suffered sufficient injury to comply with Article III's "case or 
controversy" requirement. See Department of Commerce v. 
United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329- 
30, 119 S. Ct. 765, 772-73, 142 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1999); 
Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph Munson Co., Inc., 
467 U.S. 947, 958-59, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2848, 81 L. Ed. 2d 
947 (1984) (question of whether challenged statute was 
substantially overbroad was question better left for merits, 
not resolved as part of standing inquiry). The threshold 
standing inquiry is analogous in this regard to the 
threshold question of Article III subject matter jurisdiction, 
where the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted does not mean that federal question jurisdiction is 
lacking. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 
83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This Article III injury requirement is related to the prudential rule, 
discussed infra, that litigants should not assert the rights of third 
parties 
unless they have a "sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of [the] 
suit to make it a case or controversy." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 
112 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2873, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1976). These two 
requirements are thus "not completely severable." Secretary of State of 
Maryland v. Joseph Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 955-56 n.5, 104 S. 
Ct. 2839, 2846 n.5, 81 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1984). 
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Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776, 90 L. 
Ed. 939 (1946). The Pitt News has alleged a sufficiently 
personal injury to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement of 




Next, to determine whether The Pitt News has Article III 
standing we must ascertain whether the alleged injury-in- 
fact is causally connected and traceable to an action of the 
defendants. See Doe v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 
F.3d 146, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999). One could argue that the 
injury alleged by The Pitt News is not fairly traceable to the 
enforcement of Act 199, because the harm felt by the 
newspaper results from the independent acts of third 
parties. The Pitt News has lost revenue because its 
advertisers decided to stop paying to place advertisements 
in the newspaper. Therefore, arguably, any harm to The Pitt 
News was caused by the independent action of these third- 
party advertisers, and did not result from the enforcement 
of Act 199 itself. 
 
We reject this argument, and conclude that the injury 
alleged by The Pitt News is fairly traceable to the 
enforcement of Act 199. To analogize this situation to a 
familiar example in tort law, the enforcement of Act 199 
was the cause-in-fact of the financial impact felt by The Pitt 
News. `But for' this enforcement, its advertisers would not 
have canceled their contracts. See Murray v. Fairbanks 
Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 160 (3d Cir. 1979) (distinguishing 
between causation-in-fact and proximate cause based on 
foreseeability and intervening acts). This result was not 
only reasonably foreseeable when the Commonwealth 
decided to enact and enforce Act 199, see id. , it was the 
very goal of the statute. 
 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 
1164, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997), supports the conclusion 
that The Pitt News' alleged injury meets the traceability 
prong of the standing inquiry. In Bennett, the plaintiff sued 
one government agency, `Agency A,' which had coerced a 
second agency, `Agency B,' into enacting certain regulations 
that injured the plaintiff. The Court held that the plaintiff 
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had standing to sue `Agency A,' even though it did not 
actually enact the regulations at issue. The rationale was 
that the plaintiff's injuries were directly traceable to the 
actions of `Agency A,' because `Agency B' would not have 
enacted the challenged regulation `but for' the actions of 
`Agency A.' Following this logic, The Pitt News' alleged injury 





Finally, the plaintiff only has Article III standing if "it is 
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 
693, 704, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000). On these facts, it is not 
"merely speculative" that The Pitt News  will see a dramatic 
increase in its advertising revenues if Act 199 is struck 
down as unconstitutional. Enforcement of Act 199 clearly 
led The Pitt News' advertisers to cancel their contracts with 
the student newspaper. Although these advertisers have 
since utilized other methods for distributing their message 
to their target audience, we may assume based on the past 
revenues generated by The Pitt News and the sudden drop- 
off in those revenues after the enforcement of Act 199 
against one of its advertisers, that its past advertisers 
and/or new businesses are likely to continue to advertise 
alcoholic beverages in The Pitt News if it becomes legal for 
them to do so. 
 
The Pitt News therefore has Article III standing to bring 
its claim, at least to the extent that its own rights are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Of course our conclusion regarding traceability in the standing context 
is not the same as a determination that the alleged injury flows from an 
actual violation of The Pitt News' First Amendment rights. A party may 
demonstrate standing to litigate a claim even if they fail to make out a 
constitutional violation on the merits. There is thus no inconsistency 
between our holding that the injury to The Pitt News was fairly traceable 
to the enactment and enforcement of Act 199 for standing purposes, and 
our discussion, infra, holding that The Pitt News suffered only an 
indirect injury that did not amount to a violation of its First Amendment 
rights on the merits. 
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concerned, because it has made sufficient allegations that 
it suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the 
actions of the defendant-appellees, and that is likely to be 
redressable by an action of this Court. 
 
B. Prudential Standing 
 
We turn now to the prudential factors that affect The Pitt 
News' ability to raise the rights of third parties. In addition 
to asserting its own rights, The Pitt News also attempts to 
argue that enforcement of Act 199 violates the First 
Amendment rights of its former advertisers, who are subject 
to the provisions of the statute, as well as those of its adult 
readers.5 However, the federal courts adhere to a prudential 
rule that "[o]rdinarily, one may not claim standing . . . to 
vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party." 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2874, 
49 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1976) (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U.S. 249, 255, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 1034, 97 L. Ed. 1586 
(1953)). We apply this prudential rule against third party 
standing6 even when the requirements of Article III have 
been met, to "avoid deciding questions of broad social 
import . . . [and] to limit access to the federal courts to 
those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99- 
100, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979). 
 
There is, however, a narrow exception to the prohibition 
on third party standing, provided three criteria are 
satisfied. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an actual 
injury, although not necessarily one to its own legally 
protected interests. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although it can be difficult to draw a distinction between the two, the 
First Amendment rights of both speakers and listeners can be implicated 
by government regulation. See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 
(1997) (Government's legitimate interest in protecting children "does not 
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to 
adults."). 
 
6. This prudential rule is also referred to as the rule against bringing 
jus 
tertii claims. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804, 
105 
S. Ct. 2965, 2970, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985). 
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111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-71, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991). 
Second, the plaintiff must have a close enough relationship 
with the party whose rights he or she is asserting,"thus 
giving him or her a `sufficiently concrete interest' in the 
outcome of the issue in dispute" and ensuring that the 
plaintiff will be an effective advocate. Id. Third, "there must 
exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect 
his or her own interests." Id. Thus, a plaintiff who meets all 
these criteria, but who would otherwise lack Article III 
standing to sue because his or her own legally protected 
rights were not injured, may assert the rights of a third party.7 
The impact felt by such a plaintiff, combined with the 
nexus between the plaintiff's injury and the rights of the 
third party, are sufficient to satisfy both Article III's 
constitutional requirements and judicially-created 
prudential concerns. 
 
Although The Pitt News has not suffered an injury to its 
own constitutionally protected interests, it has nonetheless 
sustained a sufficient injury-in-fact, as a result of its lost 
advertising revenue, to satisfy the exception'sfirst criterion. 
It also has a sufficiently close relationship with the third 
party advertisers to satisfy the exception's second criterion, 
because of the contractual relationship that existed 
between them.8 The problem with The Pitt News' attempt to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren , 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L. Ed. 2d 
397 (1976) (beer vendor given standing to challenge statute that 
prevented males between the age of 18 and 21 from buying beer, after 
an original plaintiff in case turned 21 -- it would presumably be 
difficult 
for any plaintiff to litigate up to the Supreme Court within the three 
years before his case became moot); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 
S. Ct. 2868, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1976) (doctor could challenge regulation 
on abortion on behalf of pregnant women when his fees were at stake -- 
it would be virtually impossible for any pregnant woman to litigate her 
case to the Supreme Court before it became moot); NAACP v. Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958) (NAACP can 
assert right to privacy of its members to avoid necessity of their 
appearing in court, and therefore losing the right they were trying to 
assert); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 
1586 (1953) (allowing white property owner to challenge racially 
restrictive covenant on land because African-American attempting to buy 
land from him would not have standing to make such a challenge). 
8. We will assume that The Pitt News also has a sufficiently close 
connection with its readers to satisfy this criterion as well. Because we 
conclude that The Pitt News may not assert third party standing in this 
case, we need not decide this question. 
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assert the rights of third parties lies with thefinal criterion. 
The Pitt News has not demonstrated that the advertisers 
actually subject to Act 199, or its adult readers, have any 
impediment to bringing their own suit to challenge the 
statute. In most cases, we would therefore conclude at this 
point that the plaintiff could not assert third party 
standing. However, we must consider whether the assertion 
of First Amendment rights in this case requires us to relax 
this third criterion. 
 
The Pitt News raises Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 
the New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 112 
S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1991) to support its 
argument that First Amendment challenges are not subject 
to the jus tertii prudential rule. In Simon & Schuster, a book 
publisher challenged a statute affecting profits from books 
written by perpetrators about their crimes. Publishers were 
required by the statute at issue to place the author's share 
of profits from these books into escrow. The escrow fund 
was then used to pay off perpetrators' civil liability to their 
victims. The Pitt News argues that because the publisher in 
that case had standing to sue, it should as well. However, 
the Supreme Court avoided addressing the standing issue 
in Simon & Schuster, noting that whether the proper litigant 
was the publisher or the author, the results would be the 
same. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116, 112 S. 
Ct. at 508. The case is therefore inconclusive. Because 
Simon & Schuster is not dispositive, we will turn instead to 
a line of authority specifically addressing the availability of 
third party standing when First Amendment rights are at 
stake.9 
 
In Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph Munson Co., 
Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 81 L. Ed. 2d 947 
(1984), the plaintiff was a professional, for-profit fund- 
raising company. Maryland enacted a statute prohibiting 
charitable organizations from paying or agreeing to pay 
more than 25% of the proceeds from fundraising events as 
expenses.10 Munson claimed that it regularly charged more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.  Although neither party discussed this line of authority, we find it 
helpful to our analysis. 
 
10. An exception was made if a charitable organization was otherwise 
unable to raise funds. 
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than 25% of the gross for the fund-raising events it 
organized on behalf of its clients. Munson stated in its 
complaint that its customers were reluctant to do business 
with it as a result of the enactment of the statute, and also 
that the Secretary of State told Munson that the company 
would be subject to prosecution under the statute. See 
Joseph Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. at 954-55, 104 S. Ct. at 
2845-46. The Supreme Court held that Munson did have 
standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its clients, 
because the company suffered an injury-in-fact that 
complied with Article III's standing requirements, and 
because Munson could adequately frame the issues 
regarding the rights of these third parties. 
 
In discussing standing, the Munson Court noted the 
general prudential limitation that plaintiffs generally cannot 
assert "the legal rights or interests of third parties." Joseph 
Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. at 955, 104 S. Ct. at 2846 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S. Ct. 
2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975)) (additional citations 
omitted). However, the Court concluded that when a 
plaintiff attempts to challenge a statute as being an 
overbroad restriction on First Amendment rights, the 
requirement that an impediment exist to the third party 
asserting his or her own rights should be relaxed: 
 
       Even where a First Amendment challenge could be 
       brought by one actually engaged in protected activity, 
       there is a possibility that, rather than risk punishment 
       for his conduct in challenging the statute, he will 
       refrain from engaging further in the protected activity. 
       Society as a whole then would be the loser. Thus, when 
       there is a danger of chilling free speech, the concern 
       that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever 
       possible may be outweighed by society's interest in 
       having the statute challenged. "Litigants, therefore, are 
       permitted to challenge a statute [in such a case] not 
       because their own rights of free expression are violated, 
       but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that 
       the statute's very existence may cause others not 
       before the court to refrain from constitutionally 
       protected speech or expression." 
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Joseph Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. at 956-57, 104 S. Ct. at 
2847 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 
93 S. Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973) (involving 
class action challenge to state statute severely curtailing 
the types of political activity in which state employees could 
engage)). Munson thus holds that the prudential standards 
governing the assertion of third party rights may be relaxed 
in the First Amendment context, when the Court 
determines that society's interest in preventing the chilling 
of free speech outweighs the normal prudential concerns 
that prohibit jus tertii claims. 
 
The fact that prudential standards may be relaxed in 
appropriate cases, however, does not mean we must relax 
them in this case. "In determining whether a litigant should 
be able to assert third-party rights, a crucial factor is `the 
impact of the litigation on the third-party interests.' " 
Joseph Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. at 956-57 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2847 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445, 92 
S. Ct. 1029, 1034, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1972)). To circumvent 
the rule against third party standing, the plaintiff must also 
demonstrate more than a mere interference with the third 
party's rights. "Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose 
own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a 
statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First 
Amendment rights of other parties not before the court." 
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 
444 U.S. 620, 634, 100 S. Ct. 826, 834, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73 
(1980) (emphasis added) (challenging ordinance prohibiting 
all door-to-door or on-street solicitation of funds for 
charities failing to use at least 75% of their proceeds for 
charitable purposes). 
 
Munson, Eisenstadt, and Village of Schaumburg all 
involved substantial threats to free speech, such that third 
parties were forced to forego their rights entirely, or else 
face criminal prosecution to vindicate them. Thus, 
application of the prudential rule against third party 
standing "would have [had] an intolerable, inhibitory effect 
on freedom of speech" in those cases. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 445 n.5, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 1034, 31 L. Ed. 2d 
349 (1972). They also involved allegations of substantial 
overbreadth, such that parties who should not have had 
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their freedom of speech restricted nonetheless found that 
freedom chilled. See Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1122 
n.5 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045, 115 S. Ct. 
641, 130 L. Ed. 2d 546 ("The Supreme Court has 
recognized that, in certain cases, the risk that a third 
party's free speech may be `chilled' by an overbroad statute 
or ordinance may warrant the grant of standing to a party 
whose speech is not protected by the First Amendment."). 
 
When we look to the effect of Act 199 on the third parties 
in the present case, however, as we are required to do by 
Joseph Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. at 956-57 n.7, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2847, we do not see the sort of dangers that have 
warranted relaxing prudential requirements in the cases 
cited above. The Pitt News has not demonstrated, as part of 
its burden in establishing its standing to assert third party 
rights, that its former advertisers are likely to have their 
speech chilled by the enactment of Act 199, or that there is 
a risk they will forego their constitutionally protected rights. 
Nor has it demonstrated that adult members of the 
University of Pittsburgh community will find their access to 
alcohol-related advertisements diluted. In fact, The Pitt 
News admits that despite enforcement of Act 199, its 
former advertisers have had an easy time delivering their 
messages to students and staff of all ages. 
 
       [T]he very same ads that are prohibited in The Pitt 
       News are available to underage students through other 
       newspapers displayed on campus news racks 
       immediately adjacent to The Pitt News. . . . Beer and 
       alcoholic beverage advertisements reach students 
       under age twenty-one through a variety of magazines, 
       radio and television advertisements, and sidewalk 
       billboards, all of which are readily available both on 
       and near the campus. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 39-40. 
 
The third parties in question have thus not suffered 
substantial abridgement of their free speech rights. Instead, 
that speech has been channeled to widely available non- 
student publications that The Pitt News admits are 
distributed at the same locations as its own newspapers. 
The content of that speech is thus available to the entire 
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University of Pittsburgh community. The effect on third 
parties, therefore, is minimal in this case.11 Because we 
must balance the effect of the challenged statute on third 
parties against the importance of the prudential rule 
prohibiting third party standing, we therefore conclude that 
The Pitt News does not qualify for an exception to this 
prudential standing rule.12 
 
That Act 199 has not had a sufficiently noticeable effect 
on free speech to warrant third party standing should not 
be surprising. As the Supreme Court has recognized,"[f]or 
the purposes of applying the overbreadth doctrine . . . it 
remains relevant to distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial speech." Village of Schaumburg , 444 U.S. at 
632 n.7, 100 S. Ct. at 834. 
 
       [T]he justification for the application of overbreadth 
       analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary 
       commercial context. . . . [T]here are `commonsense 
       differences' between commercial speech and other 
       varieties. Since advertising is linked to commercial 
       well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is 
       particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad 
       regulation. Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in 
       determining the scope of protection are reduced. . . 
       Since overbreadth has been described by this Court as 
       `strong medicine,' which `has been employed . . . 
       sparingly and only as a last resort,' Broadrick v. 
       Oklahoma, 413 U.S., at 613, 93 S. Ct., at 2916, we 
       decline to apply it to professional advertising, a context 
       where it is not necessary to further its intended 
       objective. 
 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81, 97 S. 
Ct. 2691, 2707-08, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977) (citations 
omitted). See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We note that even the "Fuel & Fuddle," which was actually 
prosecuted under Act 199, did not find it worthwhile to challenge its 
constitutionality. This fact is of course hardly dispositive, as many 
factors go into a decision whether or not to litigate. 
 
12. In reaching this conclusion with regard to third party standing, we of 
course reach no conclusions regarding whether Act 199 may be 
successfully challenged on other constitutional grounds. 
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Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6, 
100 S. Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 ("[C]ommercial 
speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy 
breed of expression that is not `particularly susceptible to 
being crushed by overbroad regulation.' "). The same 
reasoning that underlies the limitation of the application of 
an overbreadth challenge in the commercial context also 
supports our limitation on third party standing in this 
context. 
 
C. Likelihood The Pitt News' First Amendment Claim Will 
Succeed on the Merits 
 
We now proceed to determine whether The Pitt News has 
demonstrated that it is entitled to preliminary injunctive 
relief for the indirect economic loss it alleges. In ruling on 
a motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court 
must consider the following factors, and issue an injunction 
only if all four factors favor preliminary relief: (a) the 
likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its 
claim at the final hearing; (b) the extent to which the 
plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the conduct 
complained of; (c) the extent to which the defendant would 
suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is 
issued; and (d) the public interest. See New Jersey Hosp. 
Ass'n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
District Court concluded that even if The Pitt News had 
standing, the newspaper would not be entitled to a 
preliminary injunction because it had not shown 
irreparable harm. We agree that The Pitt News  is not 
entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. We need not reach 
the question of irreparable harm, however, because we 
conclude that The Pitt News has not shown a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its claim. 
 
The Pitt News claims that its First Amendment rights 
have been injured by the enforcement of Act 199, even 
though Section 4-498(e)(5) can only be enforced against 
advertisers. The Pitt News claims that although it cannot be 
prosecuted under the Act, the loss of advertising revenue 
resulting from the Act's enforcement has reduced the 
amount of space it has available to publish articles and 
photographs, thereby interfering with its right to freedom of 
the press. 
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We disagree. The fact that The Pitt News has 
demonstrated a connection between the enforcement of Act 
199 and the reduction in its advertising revenues from 
purveyors of alcoholic beverages, along with the resulting 
reduction in the length of its publication, does not mean 
that one of its constitutionally protected interests has been 
injured. This amounts to nothing more than an incidental 
economic effect of a regulation aimed at closely regulated 
third parties. Act 199 does not directly restrict the content 
of The Pitt News. It is free to seek advertising from a myriad 
of sources, including purveyors of alcoholic beverages, so 
long as those beverages are not mentioned in the 
advertisements. Additionally, according to the LCB, The Pitt 
News could, for instance, contact area bars,find out what 
their nightly drink specials are, and publish a weekly listing 
of goings-on about town -- so long as The Pitt News did not 
receive any consideration for doing so. There is thus no 
direct limitation on the freedom of The Pitt News to publish 
alcohol-related information. 
 
The fact that The Pitt News is a newspaper does not give 
it a constitutional right to a certain level of profitability, or 
even to stay in business at all. The Pitt News  "proceeds on 
the erroneous premise that it has a constitutional right not 
only to speak, but to speak profitably." AMSAT Cable Ltd. v. 
Cablevision of Connecticut, 6 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that although content of cable television 
transmissions has First Amendment protection, government 
regulation that has incidental economic effect of forcing 
cable operator out of business does not injure operator's 
First Amendment rights). "[E]conomic loss . .. does not 
constitute a first amendment injury. `The inquiry for First 
Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic 
impact; rather, it looks only to the effect of [an] ordinance 
upon freedom of expression.' " Warner Cable 
Communications, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638 
(11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 111 S. Ct. 
2839, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (1991) (quoting Young v. 
American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78, 96 S. Ct. 
2440, 2456, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1976) (Powell, J., 
concurring)). Thus, although it is true that the enforcement 
of Act 199 has had the effect of driving away certain closely 
regulated businesses who previously advertised in The Pitt 
 
                                18 
  
News, this does not in itself amount to a violation of The 
Pitt News' First Amendment rights. 
 
In an effort to avoid this reasoning, The Pitt News 
advances a "selective tax" argument. It points to a line of 
cases holding that it is unconstitutional to impose selective 
taxes or other financial burdens on newspapers because of 
their content. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 95 L. Ed. 2d 209 
(1987) (placing sales tax on certain publications based on 
their content violates First Amendment). Selective tax cases 
are distinguishable for two reasons. First, they involve 
taxes, not regulations on advertising. Second, they involve 
fees levied directly against a newspaper. In the present 
case, no taxes or fees have been levied against The Pitt 
News. Further, as discussed above, the content of The Pitt 
News is not directly regulated or penalized by Act 199. 
Therefore, this selective tax argument is unavailing. 
 
Because its constitutional rights have not been infringed, 
any economic effect on the advertising revenue of The Pitt 
News is therefore incidental to the challenged regulation. 
Thus, although The Pitt News has no doubt felt an 
economic effect resulting from the enforcement of Act 199, 




13. We recognize that portions of The Pitt News' complaint can be 
construed as asserting an additional right, the newspaper's right to 
determine its own advertising content. See Complaint PP. 1, 26, 35, 49. 
It is true that newspapers do have a legitimate First Amendment interest 
in their advertising content as well as their editorial content, see 
Bigelow 
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2234, 44 L. Ed. 2d 600 
(1975); however, The Pitt News has not demonstrated that Act 199 poses 
a concrete threat to that right. Because the LCB has ruled that Act 199 
can only be enforced against liquor licensees or manufacturers, Act 199 
cannot prevent The Pitt News from publishing information about the 
prices and availability of liquor. See A. at 236, 262-64, 290 (Deposition 
of Faith S. Diehl, Chief Counsel of the LCB). Therefore, The Pitt News 
can claim only that Act 199 poses a threat to the newspaper's ability to 
receive compensation for publishing this information, not the 
newspaper's ability to publish the information. As we discussed above, 
harm to the ability to profit from publication is not a First Amendment 
harm. 
 




For the reasons stated above, Appellant, The Pitt News, 
has standing to challenge 47 P.S. S 4-498(e)(5) on its own 
behalf, but lacks standing to challenge it on behalf of its 
former advertisers or its adult readers. We therefore do not 
reach the merits of its constitutional challenges regarding 
those third parties. As for The Pitt News' own First 
Amendment challenge, we conclude that the newspaper has 
not shown a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its 
claim that the enforcement of 47 P.S. S 4-498(e)(5) has 
violated its right to free speech. 
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